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Jack Fitzpatrick's avatar

My take: Rosenquist is directionally right, but he’s describing a symptom, not the underlying strategic shift.

His central argument is that frontier AI models such as Mythos are collapsing vulnerability discovery and exploitation timelines from weeks or months to minutes, forcing defenders to operate at machine speed. That is happening. AI is becoming dramatically better at finding attack paths, chaining low-severity weaknesses together, and overwhelming traditional patch-and-prioritize workflows.

Where I think the analysis is strongest:

* AI is compressing decision cycles.

* Vulnerability management as a human workflow is breaking.

* Organizations that depend on quarterly scans, ticket queues, and manual remediation will lose the race.

* Security teams will need AI fighting AI.

Where I think he’s still looking through a traditional cybersecurity lens:

The assumption is that the game is still “find vulnerabilities faster and patch faster.”

That was the game when the primary objective was system compromise.

The emerging game is leverage.

Attackers do not get paid for finding CVEs.

Attackers get paid when they can:

* Steal data

* Encrypt data

* Disrupt operations

* Extort executives

The vulnerability is only a means to acquire leverage.

That’s the Sachsian view.

If AI finds 500,000 vulnerabilities tomorrow, the board still asks one question:

“What can the attacker actually do if they get in?”

That shifts the discussion from:

* Vulnerability management

* Exposure management

* Risk scoring

* Attack-path analysis

to:

* Execution control

* Data theft prevention

* Encryption prevention

* Business continuity

The deeper platform shift is not AI-powered vulnerability discovery.

The deeper platform shift is that AI makes perimeter and detection-centric security less economically valuable.

If both attacker and defender have superhuman discovery capability, discovery itself becomes commoditized.

Control becomes scarce.

That is why I keep coming back to the same question:

What intervenes when a system starts making the wrong decisions in real time?

Not:

* Who detected it?

* Who scored it?

* Who visualized it?

* Who generated the dashboard?

But who stopped it?

Even the latest research suggests frontier models still generate significant false positives and are far from perfect autonomous security operators. Methodology and execution controls remain critical.

The strategic implication for executives is:

Visibility is becoming abundant. Control remains scarce.

The winners of the next decade may not be the companies that find the most problems.

They may be the companies that can reliably prevent the consequences after compromise.

That’s a much larger platform shift than faster vulnerability scanning.

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